Above the Cloud: Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Aerospace Sector by Shackelford, Scott J. & Russell, Scott, J.D.
FIU Law Review 
Volume 10 Number 2 Article 16 
Spring 2015 
Above the Cloud: Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Aerospace 
Sector 
Scott J. Shackelford 
Indiana University 
Scott Russell J.D. 
Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Other Law Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell J.D., Above the Cloud: Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Aerospace 
Sector, 10 FIU L. Rev. 635 (2015). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/16 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU 
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 144 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 144 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
SHACKELFORD & RUSSELL (DO NOT DELETE)  1/7/16 2:21 PM
Above the Cloud: 
Enhancing Cybersecurity in the Aerospace Sector 
Scott J. Shackelford, J.D., Ph.D.*? & Scott Russell, J.D.**??
ABSTRACT
Congressional testimony shows that NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab was under 
sustained cyber attacks for years. Yet this episode was only part of a string 
of some thirteen successful breaches in 2011 alone, prompting an 
investigation by the NASA Office of Inspector General, which stated: “We 
found that computer servers on NASA’s Agency-wide mission network had 
high-risk vulnerabilities that were exploitable from the Internet.” The report 
goes on to note, “[t]hese deficiencies occurred because NASA had not fully 
assessed and mitigated risks to its Agency-wide mission network and was 
slow to assign responsibility for IT security oversight to ensure the network 
was adequately protected.” Yet NASA is far from the only victim in the air 
and space sector of cyber attacks. Organizations ranging from defense 
contractors like Lockheed Martin to SpaceX have been targeted, and 
sometimes penetrated, resulting in the loss of invaluable trade secrets that 
impact economic competitiveness and national security alike. This Article 
argues that a polycentric response is needed to manage the cyber threat to 
the aerospace sector. As part of this approach, aerospace organizations 
should utilize the recently released National Institute for Standards and 
Technology Cybersecurity Framework to better protect their assets by 
instilling cybersecurity best practices from the bottom up, and should 
engage in more robust information sharing, similar to recent efforts in the 
critical infrastructure and retail sectors. 
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Applied Cybersecurity Research; W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow, 
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INTRODUCTION
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory was under sustained cyber attacks 
for years, according to Congressional testimony.1 Yet this incident was only 
part of a string of some thirteen successful NASA breaches in 2011 alone,2
prompting an investigation by the NASA Office of Inspector General. 
Following an investigation by the NASA Office of the Inspector General, 
the Officer released a report that stated: “We found that computer servers 
on NASA’s Agency-wide mission network had high-risk vulnerabilities that 
were exploitable from the Internet.”3 The report further notes, “[t]hese 
deficiencies occurred because NASA had not fully assessed and mitigated 
risks to its Agency-wide mission network and was slow to assign 
responsibility for IT security oversight to ensure the network was 
adequately protected.”4 Yet NASA is far from the only cyber attack victim 
in the aerospace sector. Organizations ranging from defense contractors like 
1 Marc Boucher, NASA Has Been under Heavy Cyber Attack, NASA WATCH (Mar. 5, 2013, 7:36 
AM), http://nasawatch.com/archives/2013/03/nasa-has-been-u.html.
2 See Emil Protalinski, NASA: Hackers Had ‘Full Functional Control’, ZDNET (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/nasa-hackers-had-full-functional-control/10443.
3 NASA OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., INADEQUATE SECURITY PRACTICES EXPOSE KEY NASA
NETWORK TO CYBER ATTACK (2011), http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-017.pdf. 
4 Id.
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Lockheed Martin to product manufacturers like Space Exploration 
Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) have been targeted, and sometimes 
penetrated, resulting in the loss of valuable trade secrets that impact 
economic competitiveness and national security alike.5 This Article argues 
that a “polycentric” response is needed to manage the cyber threat to the 
aerospace sector.6 As part of this approach, aerospace organizations should 
utilize the recently released National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Cybersecurity Framework to better protect their assets by instilling 
cybersecurity best practices from the bottom up,7 as well as engaging in 
more robust information sharing similar to recent efforts in the critical 
infrastructure and retail sectors.8
This Article is structured as follows. Part I begins the analysis by 
breaking down the multifaceted cyber threat to critical infrastructure 
generally before focusing on the issue of protecting trade secrets in the 
aerospace sector. Case studies on effective and ineffective cybersecurity 
management are offered that include surveying the likes of Boeing and 
NASA.9 Part II then pivots to the regulatory landscape discussing 
applicable U.S., European Union, and international laws for securing trade 
secrets, with special emphasis on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, 
which is comprised partly of private-sector best practices that companies 
could adopt to better secure critical infrastructure.10 Finally, Part III makes 
the case for a proactive approach to identifying and instilling the best 
5 See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, August Cole & Yochi Dreazen, Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet 
Project, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027491029837401.
html; Andrea Tse, See What Elon Musk’s Right Hand Man Has to Say About Cyber Hackers, THE ST.
(Feb. 25, 2014, 2:57 PM), available at http://www.thestreet.com/story/12441320/1/see-what-elon-
musks-right-hand-man-has-to-say-about-cyber-hackers.html.
6 See Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An Equilibrium 
Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care (2011), http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/Beijing_core.
pdf.
7 NAT’L INST. STAN. & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY VER. 1.0, at 1 (2014) [hereinafter NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK].
8 The aviation sector planned such an information-sharing organization to launch in September 
2014, which, we argue, should expand to the aerospace sector writ large. See Aviation Info-Sharing 
Body Refining Structure Before September Launch, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY (July 16, 2014), http://
alturl.com/9roi9.
9 These two case studies were chosen given that they represent leading public- and private-sector 
entities in the aerospace sector. Other organizations such as SpaceX would be invaluable to focus on as 
well, but unfortunately not enough public information exists that we could locate to warrant in-depth 
analysis.
10 See WHITE HOUSE PRESS SEC’Y, EXECUTIVE ORDER ON IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-0; Mark Clayton, Why
Obama’s Executive Order on Cybersecurity Doesn’t Satisfy Most Experts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0213/Why-Obama-s-
executive-order-on-cybersecurity-doesn-t-satisfy-most-experts.
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cybersecurity practices throughout the aerospace sector as part of a 
“polycentric” approach to fostering cyber peace. 
I. THE CYBER THREAT TO THE AEROSPACE SECTOR
To put it plainly, space, particularly commercial space, is a big deal. 
Commercial spending in space surpassed $250 billion in 2008.11 NASA 
officials endorse this private sector interest, with former NASA 
Administrator Michael Griffin stating, “[s]ooner rather than later, 
government space activity must become a lesser rather than a greater part of 
what it is that humans do in space.”12 Yet, even as the private sector 
emerges as a key player in space, other stakeholders including nations are 
reassessing, and in some cases reasserting space policies.13 The final 
frontier is getting more crowded thanks to increased national attention on 
space exploration, heightened private-sector interest, and the intensified use 
of cyberspace to provide new opportunities for space commerce.14 The 
intersection of these forces has provided fertile ground for a multitude of 
public-and private-sector actors to leverage the new tools of cyberspace, 
including cyber attacks, to gain commercial and national security 
advantages.15 This Part explores the evolution of the cyber threat to the 
aerospace sector focusing on trade secret theft and introduces the 
implications of the aerospace sector being designated as one component of 
U.S. critical national infrastructure. 
A.  Breaking Down the Cyber Threat to Critical Infrastructure 
According to a 2009 McAfee/CSIS report, “[c]ritical infrastructure 
owners and operators report that their networks and control systems are 
under repeated cyberattack, often by high-level adversaries [such as foreign 
governments].”16 Indeed, some utilities have reported being probed 
11 See SPACE FOUNDATION, THE SPACE REPORT 2008: THE AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO GLOBAL
SPACE ACTIVITY 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter THE SPACE REPORT]. Recent developments such as U.S.-based 
SpaceX successful resupply mission to the ISS underscore this trend. See, e.g., Frank Morring, Jr., 
SpaceX Success Gives Commercial Spaceflight a Boost, AVIATION WK. (June 18, 2012), http://www.
aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_06_18_2012_p26-466690.xml.
12 MICHAEL GRIFFIN, REMARKS AT CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., WORKSHOP ON SPACE
EXPLORATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 1 (Nov. 1, 2005), available at www.nasa.gov/pdf/
137173main_mg_csis.pdf.
13 See Scott J. Shackelford, Governing the Final Frontier: A Polycentric Approach to Managing 
Space Weaponization and Debris, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 429, 430–35 (2014) (exploring the evolution of 
space commerce along with the use of polycentric governance to mitigate threats to its development, 
including orbital debris). 
14 See id.
15 See infra notes 1–5. 
16 IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR, MCAFEE/CSIS 1 
(2009), http://iom.invensys.com/EN/pdfLibrary/McAfee/WP_McAfee_In_The_Crossfire_03-10.pdf
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thousands of times per month.17 These figures point to the various 
dimensions of the cyber threat facing the private-sector, which are often 
broken down into cyber war, crime, espionage, and terrorism. However, 
given the overlap in these categories and our focus on critical infrastructure, 
of particular relevance is the management of cyber attacks below the armed 
attack threshold – namely, cybercrime and espionage.18
Defending critical infrastructure (CI) against the threat posed by cyber 
attacks has been of increasing interest to governments the world over, but 
vexing given the need for active private-sector involvement in an arena 
where the vast majority of CI is privately operated.19 In 2009, soon after 
taking office, President Obama ordered a systemic review of U.S. 
cybersecurity in critical infrastructure,20 which concluded that cybersecurity 
was a “strategic national asset” leading to the creation of the U.S. Cyber 
Command (CYBERCOM): the military command tasked with oversight of 
U.S. cybersecurity for the dot-mil domain.21 Yet this development is 
notable as much for what it leaves out as for what it protects. Maintaining 
adequate cybersecurity across the spectrum of U.S. critical infrastructure 
has proven to be a herculean task that, to this day, has not been adequately 
addressed, though the NIST Cybersecurity Framework referenced above 
and discussed further below does show some promise.22
Despite wide consensus that the protection of CI generally should be a 
priority, there is less clarity as to the scope of what exactly constitutes CI. 
At a high level of abstraction, CI may be considered all “systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital . . . that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, 
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of those matters.”23 Such was the definition of CI in the 
[hereinafter IN THE CROSSFIRE].
17 MCAFEE & CSIS, IN THE DARK: CRITICAL INDUSTRIES CONFRONTING CYBERATTACKS 5 
(2011), available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-critical-infrastructure-protection.
pdf.
18 For more on this distinction, see Chapter 1 of SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER
ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE (2014).
19 See, e.g., Bruce McConnell, Working Together to Strengthen the Nation’s Critical 
Infrastructure, DHS (May 2, 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/blog/2013/05/02/working-together-strengthen-
nation%E2%80%99s-critical-infrastructure. 
20 See Roy Mark, Obama Orders 60-Day Cyber-Security Review, EWEEK (Feb. 2, 2010), http://
www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Obama-Orders-60Day-Cyber-Security-Review/. 
21 See Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD Announces First U.S. Cyber Command and 
First U.S. CYBERCOM Commander (May 21, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.
aspx?releaseid=13551.
22 See, e.g., Jeremy Broggi, Building on Executive Order 13,636 to Encourage Information 
Sharing for Cybersecurity Purposes, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2014). 
23 Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195(e) (2012). 
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Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001.24 Yet this definition provides 
little practical clarity to the issue and is articulated so broadly that nearly 
every industry could be considered “critical.” To help address this situation, 
Presidential Policy Directive 21 identifies sixteen sectors, ranging from 
energy to manufacturing to financial services, that are deemed “critical 
infrastructure.”25 Although aerospace is not mentioned per se in this list, the 
fact that both the “defense industrial base” and “transportation systems” are 
mentioned makes it likely that aerospace would in fact be included in this 
CI regulation.26
Notwithstanding the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, in 
practice CI oversight is distributed between various agencies based on the 
specific sector in play, e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency covers 
the water supply, while the Department of the Treasury handles finance.27
As such, CI protection in the United States is a piecemeal collection of 
myriad regulations with numerous overlapping regulatory bodies, each with 
distinct systems, methods, priorities, and goals.28 This sector-specific 
approach (unlike the situation in Europe, as is discussed in Part II), though, 
misses the fact that by its nature CI is interconnected. A failure in the 
electrical grid would impact public health, communications, and defense, to 
name only a few sectors. This inherent interconnectivity makes CI uniquely 
vulnerable to cyber attacks.29 Since most every CI sector relies on the 
Internet or computer networks, each is a potential target for cyber attacks.30
Therefore, robust cybersecurity in one sector could still be undermined by 
24 Id.
25 OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 21: CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil; see also What Is 
Critical Infrastructure, DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure (last visited Jan. 16, 
2014); What Is the ICS-CERT Mission?, http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Frequently-Asked-Questions (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2014) (The U.S. Cyber Emergency Response Team, which is part of DHS, identifies 
sixteen critical infrastructure sectors consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 
including: agriculture, banking and finance, chemical, commercial facilities, dams, defense industrial 
base, drinking water and water treatment systems, emergency systems, energy, government facilities, 
information technology, nuclear systems, public health and healthcare, telecommunications, and 
transportation systems.). 
26 See What Is Critical Infrastructure, supra note 25. 
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., William Jackson, Industry Needs Government Help to Protect Infrastructure, GAO 
Study Says, GCN (Jan. 10, 2012), http://gcn.com/articles/2012/01/10/critical-infrastructure-protection-
gao.aspx (“U.S. critical infrastructure protection is a patchwork process depending primarily on 
voluntary public- and private-sector cooperation that could leave large portions inadequately protected, 
according to a recent study by the Government Accountability Office.”). 
29 See U.S. Intelligence Cmty. Worldwide Threat Assessment: Statement for the Rec. Before S. 
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 1-2 (2013) (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of 
National Intelligence). 
30 Id.
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another sector’s vulnerability.31 The proverbial “weak link” in the chain of 
CI could result in catastrophic economic damage, which is compounded by 
the sheer number of access points that cyber attackers may exploit. 
Government contractors, private-sector actors, public-sector organizations, 
utilities companies, and so on, all have separate regulators, differing 
cybersecurity standards, and long supply chains.32 Taking the latter point, 
the underlying networks are composed of countless hardware components 
produced all over the globe, each creating potential security problems that 
must be assessed and, if necessary, rectified.33 For instance, the Boeing 777 
airplane consists of over three million parts produced by 500 suppliers from 
all over the globe.34 Yet from a security standpoint, Boeing must verify 
each of these prior to incorporating them into the final product, as 
vulnerabilities in key components can sabotage the entire enterprise. That is 
far easier said than done, as may be seen by reports that the satellite 
communications systems that passenger jets rely on are vulnerable to cyber 
attacks “through their WiFi and inflight entertainment systems.”35
The problem of securing vulnerable supply chains is so pervasive that 
regulators from around the world have tried various schemes to improve the 
unacceptable status quo. The Chinese government, for example, 
implemented a “multi-level protection scheme,” with industries classified 
above a three (on a scale of one to five) required to source components from 
Chinese state-affiliated companies and more broadly utilize Chinese IP.36
While such a command-and-control type regulation is unlikely to emerge in 
the United States in the foreseeable future, the U.S. government has 
restricted the utilization of component parts made by the two largest 
Chinese telecommunications providers, Huawei and ZTE.37 Furthermore, 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework emphasizes “Asset Management,” or 
that the “data, personal devices, systems, and facilities . . . are managed 
consistent with their relative importance . . . and the organization’s risk 
31 Id.
32 See GCN, supra note 28; John Villasenor, Ensuring Hardware Cybersecurity, BROOKINGS
INST. (May 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/05/hardware-cybersecurity. 
33 See id.; Bryan Krekel et al., Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber 
Espionage, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2012), http://tinyurl.com/7wsyte3. 
34 Boeing 777 Facts, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/777family/pf/pf_facts.
page (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
35 Jim Finkle, Hacker Says to Show Passenger Jets at Risk of Cyber Attacks, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hackers-airplanes-idUSKBN0G40WQ20140804. 
36 See Nathaniel Ahrens, Of Shoes, Buttons, and Routers, CSIS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://csis.org/
publication/national-security-and-chinas-information-security-standards. 
37 STAFF OF PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112th CONG., INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE, at vi (Oct. 8, 2012), http://tinyurl.com/pmuf5he. 
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strategy.”38 This highlights the fact that the U.S. government is working to 
develop a standard among private sector actors that emphasizes the need to 
identify the cyber risk presented by the scope and breadth of their business 
operations, along with the need to take appropriate actions to mitigate that 
risk.39 For example, in the aerospace context although planes may be the 
targets of cyber attacks,40 so too might the systems on which the planes 
rely. A 2010 governmental review found cyber attack vulnerabilities in the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) were due in part to outdated 
equipment usage by the air traffic control facilities.41 In this highly 
networked and visible arena, the threat of cyberterrorism to aviation in 
particular is heightened.42
Although discussions of CI security often involve speculation about 
debilitating cyber attacks that could cripple U.S. CI, in many ways the more 
pervasive and pressing concern, particularly to the aerospace sector, comes 
from the theft of trade secrets.43 Intelligence operations aside, cyber 
criminals are unlikely to perpetrate a doomsday attack on CI since it is 
much more profitable to slowly leach intellectual property from firms 
without risking a dramatic change in the regulatory or prosecutorial 
landscape. It is to that topic that we turn to next. 
B.  Trade Secrets Theft 
A trade secret may be defined in the U.S. context as “any confidential 
business information which provides an enterprise a competitive edge” and 
is not publicly known.44 Examples include formulas, sales methods, and 
38 NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 7, at 1.
39 See id.
40 Kim Zetter, FAA: Boeing’s New 787 May Be Vulnerable to Hacker Attack, WIRED (Jan. 4, 
2008), http:// www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2008/01/dreamliner_security. 
41 Lolita C. Baldor, Cyber Security Still Issue for FAA, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 13, 2010), http:// 
www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/08/13/cyber_security_still_ issue_for_faa. 
42 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Cyberterrorism: The Next Great Threat to Aviation, 24 AIR & SPACE
L. 4, 4–6 (2011). 
43 See Ellen Nakashima, White House Launches Effort to Deter Theft of Trade Secrets, WASH.
POST, Feb. 21, 2013, at A11. 
44 What is a Trade Secret?, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/trade_
secrets.htm (last visited May 6, 2014); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012) (“[T]the term ‘trade secret’ 
means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering 
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and 
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing if—(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the 
public.”).
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industrial processes.45 Trade secret theft is becoming increasingly common 
and extremely costly. Estimated losses caused by alleged Chinese trade 
secrets misappropriation alone were approximately $1.1 billion in 2011.46
Trade secrets are appealing to businesses for many reasons, including the 
relatively low cost to obtain protection,47 the potentially broad subject 
matter that may be protected, and the theoretically unlimited protection 
period (unlike, for example, the limited protection period offered by 
patents).48 Yet this low barrier-to-entry comes with greater fragility; 
disclosing secret information destroys the existence of a remedy, making 
trade secrets independently discoverable by third parties (and potentially 
patented), and seeking redress from the theft of trade secrets is often 
difficult and may result in inadequate compensation for the victim even if 
proven.49
It is easy to see why cyber criminals are so attracted to trade secrets; 
while credit card numbers may fetch pennies on the black market, valuable 
trade secrets still command a premium.50 Moreover, given the increasing 
prevalence of cloud computing, mobile devices, distributed networks, 
telecommuting, and the “Internet of things,” the number of breach points 
has escalated exponentially.51 And since a significant percentage of trade 
secret theft is allegedly perpetrated internationally, there are the added 
protections of ambiguous national and international laws relating to 
45 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which generally is followed by local authorities within the 
United States, defines a trade secret as information that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other person who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and; (ii) is the subject of efforts 
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. § 1(4)(i)–(ii) (codified as amended at 
14 U.L.A. 438 (1985), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_
final_85.pdf. This definition is reinforced by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which 
defines a trade secret as “any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other 
enterprise that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage 
over others.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
46 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUB. NO. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 3-42 (2011), 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf (reporting 2009 estimates). 
47 See Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade 
Secrets Rights in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 172, 175 (2014). 
48 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting 
that trade secret law offers protection of unlimited duration). 
49 See Argento, supra note 47, at 186. 
50 See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets are Increasingly Important, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1104–06 (2012). 
51 OFF. OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING U.S. ECONOMIC
SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND 
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 2009–2011 (2011), available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/
fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_ 2011.pdf. 
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enforcement and extradition.52 Indeed, the relative ease and safety of trade 
secret theft is such that certain governments are believed to use this practice 
as an integral part of their domestic economic policies.53
U.S. trade secret law is something of a hodgepodge of federal criminal 
laws, state criminal laws, and state civil actions.54 The majority of litigation 
around U.S. trade secrets arises in the context of state civil litigation.55
Among the states, all but three have adopted some form of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and despite some discussion on the issue, it is 
widely acknowledged that the UTSA encompasses both the theft of trade 
secrets by hacking and the misappropriation of trade secrets by company 
insiders via computers.56
International trade secret protection is even more varied. Despite 
relatively widespread acceptance of what constitutes a trade secret, the 
scope of protection varies by nation.57 Although trade secrets are included 
in the TRIPS agreement under Article 39, for example, the specific 
guidelines for how countries should implement trade secret protection is left 
to the individual countries’ determinations.58 Therefore, trade secret 
protection may be left to other mechanisms to satisfy enforcement 
internationally, such as bilateral investment treaties.59 Regardless, given 
difficulties surrounding the definition, protection, and prosecution of trade 
secret claims, firms would be well-advised to enact proactive cybersecurity 
stances as is discussed in Part III. But the extent to which aerospace 
organizations in particular are taking this advice varies by organization, as 
is discussed in the next section. 
52 See Aaron J. Burstein, Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the 
Foundations of Economic Espionage, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 933, 944–46 (2009). 
53 MANDIANT, APT 1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 21 (Jan. 2013), 
available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_ Report.pdf. 
54 See MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2.3 (2013). 
55 David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 45 
GONZ. L. REV. 291, 306 (2010-2011). 
56 See, e.g., Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two 
Problems and Two Solutions, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 442-45 (2009) (discussing disunity 
between trade secret misappropriation under the UTSA and unauthorized access of a protected computer 
under the CFAA). 
57 See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace and 
Safeguarding Trade Secrets through Bilateral Investment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2014). 
58 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm. 
59 See Shackelford et al., supra note 57. 
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C.  Case Studies in Aerospace Cybersecurity 
This section uses examples from the aerospace giants Boeing and 
NASA to highlight cybersecurity practices before moving on to discuss the 
applicable regulatory environment in greater detail in Part II. We pay 
particular attention to security lapses by these sophisticated actors since it 
demonstrates the difficulty of effectively managing cyber risk. 
1.  Boeing’s Breach 
As an example of a recent aerospace security breach and its aftermath, 
consider the recently revealed cyber attack on Boeing. The company was 
subjected to a prolonged and sophisticated cyber attack beginning in 2009, 
resulting in the loss of potentially millions of dollars in trade secrets 
relating to the C17 Military transport.60 Three Chinese nationals perpetrated 
the attack, with at least one operating out of Canada.61 Over the course of 
some four years, they obtained more than sixty-five gigabytes of data, and 
were only discovered through FBI investigation.62 Perhaps more striking 
than the quantity of data lost was the hackers’ discussion of the complexity 
and sophistication of Boeing’s cybersecurity defenses. In an internal email, 
the hackers debate Boeing’s various firewalls, intruder prevention and 
detection systems, and file transfer defenses.63 They showed a substantial 
familiarity with the architecture of Boeing’s networks and acted both 
slowly and with “meticulous planning and vigorous technical support.”64 In 
short, despite Boeing’s efforts, a team of three savvy criminals was able to 
penetrate one of the most sophisticated aerospace firms in the world. And, it 
did not take a rare zero-day exploit flaw or advanced persistent threat; just 
an email.65
Despite the aforementioned “vigorous technical support” and funding, 
Boeing, like Lockheed Martin and other aerospace firms, ultimately fell 
prey to a phishing email.66 Phishing emails are targeted attacks wherein the 
target is induced to open an attachment or click on a link, which would then 
grant the assailant control over the computer.67 Although these exploits 
have been used for some time, they are becoming more sophisticated and 
60 Criminal Complaint, United States v. Su Bin, NO. 14-1318M, (CDCA, June 27, 2014), 
available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1216505-su-bin-u-s-district-court-complaint-
june-27-2014.html.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 23. 
65 Id.
66 Id. at 11. 
67 Tom N. Jagatic et al., Social Phishing, 50 COMM. ACM 94, 94–95 (2007). 
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successful, even fooling the likes of Google employees in 2009.68
According to The Economist, “The amount of information now available 
online about individuals makes it ever easier to attack a computer by 
crafting a personalized email that is more likely to be trusted and opened.”69
From the email correspondence used to indict Su Bin, (one of the three 
hackers), it appears that he initially obtained a document containing the 
contact information of a large number of contractors and military personnel, 
and from there he was able to select the vectors for his targeted attacks.70
This suggests that it is still the human element of system security that is the 
weakest link in an insecure chain. 
The hackers’ techniques in the Boeing breach highlight the 
sophistication that can be employed in targeted cyber attacks on aerospace 
firms. They utilized jump servers, also called “hop points,” to route their 
attacks through at least three other countries and ensured that at least one of 
the countries “did not have friendly relations with the U.S.”71 In so doing, 
the hackers took advantage of technical, legal, and geopolitical hurdles that 
companies must manage when protecting against cyber threats. The hackers 
were highly familiar with the traditional cybersecurity defenses utilized by 
Boeing and organized their attack such that they avoided honeypots, 
transfer restrictions, and traditional time-based access restrictions.72
This Boeing assault identifies numerous challenges faced by large 
aerospace firms. It illustrates that firms must be aware of their place within 
the cyber threat matrix and that for multinationals, this includes protecting 
themselves from the most sophisticated actors, namely nation states. This 
necessitates staying on the cutting edge of cybersecurity best practices 
discussed in Part III, which the NIST Cybersecurity Framework combined 
with robust private-private, public-private, and private-public information 
sharing may help facilitate. 
2.  Network Defense at NASA 
Like Boeing, and as was discussed in the Introduction, NASA has had 
its fair share of cybersecurity lapses. In 2010 and 2011 alone, NASA self-
reported more than 5,000 successful cyber attacks.73 In fact, the problem 
grew to such an extent that NASA’s Inspector General had to get involved, 
issuing a report to Congress in 2011 that, among other things, cited the 
68 Spear Phishers: Angling to Steal Your Financial Info, FBI (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.fbi.
gov/news/stories/2009/april/spearphishing_040109.
69 See, e.g., Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, 25 ECONOMIST (July 3, 2010). 
70 United States v. Su Bin, supra note 60, at 20. 
71 Id. at 24. 
72 Id. at 22–23. 
73 NASA OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 3, at 1. 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 150 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 150 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
13 - SHACKELFORD_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16 2:21 PM
2015] Above the Cloud 647 
agency for the: “Lack of full awareness of [the] Agency-wide IT security 
posture . . . [the] [s]low pace of encryption for NASA laptop computers and 
other mobile devices . . . [and the lack of] [a]bility to combat sophisticated 
cyber attacks . . . .”74 Yet also like Boeing, NASA faces a difficult problem 
in getting its cyber house in order. The Agency is responsible for some 
“550 information systems that control spacecraft, collect and process 
scientific data, and enable NASA personnel to collaborate with colleagues 
around the world.”75 Moreover, these systems are not closed proprietary 
networks, but instead are open to contractors and even the general public.76
The total cost of NASA’s breaches is unknown, but given its status as 
a “target rich” environment rife with valuable trade secrets of which foreign 
governments and aerospace firms would be interested, the necessity of 
proactively defending NASA’s networks is manifest.77 Although there is a 
range of potential topics to discuss in this realm, we focus on just two, 
budgeting and organization, as a springboard for our discussion of 
cybersecurity best practices in Part III. First, out of NASA’s more than $18 
billion budget for FY 2011, it spent more than $1.5 billion (or 8.3 percent) 
of its budget on “IT-related activities.”78 Yet just $58 million of that amount 
went to cybersecurity, which works out to 4 percent of NASA’s IT 
budget.79 The U.S. government, for comparison’s sake, spends roughly 11 
percent of its public IT budget on cybersecurity, according to Booz Allen.80
Although it is not as simple as spending one’s way to cybersecurity, since 
infinite investment does not breed infinite security, such a rebalancing 
could help as NASA seeks to re-launch its cybersecurity efforts. 
Second, a key finding of the 2011 NASA IG report is that NASA 
needs a Chief Information Officer who enjoys both visibility and oversight 
authority over all the agency’s cybersecurity efforts.81 This finding is 
consistent with the literature and should be of interest to aerospace firms 
generally. Indeed, it is vital to create a “centralized management of IT 
security solutions” such that there is an automatic mechanism for measuring 
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, 2nd China Army Unit Implicated in Online Spying, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/technology/private-report-further-details-chinese-
cyberattacks.html?_r=0.
78 NASA OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 3, at 1. 
79 Id.
80 See Cyber Management, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON at 1, www.boozallen.com/media/file/cyber-
management.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (reporting that “[t]he U.S. spends $80 billion per year on 
information and communications technology—$9 billion of which goes into information technology 
(IT) security”). 
81 NASA OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 3, at 2. 
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and enforcing IT security best practices throughout an organization.82 Chief 
Information Security Officers (CISOs) are one way to achieve such 
coordination as they enable “enterprises to align information protection 
with corporate security policies and regulatory or business-partner 
mandates.”83 Companies with CISOs have saved more than twenty percent 
on the cost of data breaches over those that do not have those management 
figures in place, according to one Symantec survey.84 Firms are increasingly 
recognizing this need. In 2006, only forty-three percent of respondents to a 
PwC survey said that they had a CISO or other similar security executive, 
but by 2009, that rate had increased to 85 percent.85 NASA now has a CIO 
for IT Security,86 which should help enhance the agency’s cybersecurity 
efforts.
D.  Summary 
This Part has introduced the multifaceted cyber threat facing aerospace 
organizations, discussed some of the applicable regulatory regimes 
surrounding CI and trade secrets and ran through two case studies in 
aerospace cybersecurity defense. The next Part digs deeper into the 
applicable regulatory landscape not just in the United States, but globally 
including the European Union, paying particular attention to CI regulations 
shaping the legal environment for aerospace firms. 
II. THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Sometimes the biggest breaches begin with the smallest of actions. 
Consider the sequence of events that were initiated when a man opened an 
email entitled “2011 Recruitment Plan” in late 2011.87 He unintentionally 
allowed “hackers to raid the computer networks of his employer, RSA[,]” 
whose cybersecurity products help protect the networks of the U.S. 
government and many Fortune 500 companies.88 According to U.S. General 
Keith Alexander, former National Security Agency director and commander 
of CYBERCOM, blame for the breach lay with an organized campaign 
82 ANNUAL STUDY: U.S. COST OF A DATA BREACH, PONEMON INST. 8 (2010), http://www.fbiic.
gov/public/2011/mar/2010_Annual_Study_Data_Breach.pdf.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 32. 
85 Ralph DeFragesco, Chief Information Security Officer: A New Spin on an Old Job, IT BUS.
EDGE (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/blogs/defrangesco/chief-information-security-
officer-a-new-spin-on-an-old-job/?cs=37172.
86 See IT Sec. Div., NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/offices/ocio/itsecurity/#.VDLFf-d9nS0 (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
87 Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-Dragon, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/09/chinese-hacking-201109/. 
88 GRIFFIN, supra note 12. 
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orchestrated by elements within China.89 Among the companies targeted in 
the aftermath of the breach was Lockheed Martin, which reportedly lost 
“data on the F-35 Lightning II [jet] fighter[,]” the Defense Department’s 
most expensive weapons program.90
This episode, along with the Boeing breach discussed in Part I, helps 
illustrate some of the many facets of cybersecurity and challenges facing 
aerospace firms seeking to safeguard their trade secrets. Before turning to 
best practices in the next Part, though, it is first important to note that these 
efforts are not taking place in a legal vacuum. There is applicable U.S. law 
on point regulating the steps that companies, including those firms 
operating CI such as aerospace, must take to protect their assets and their 
customers’ data. We review these laws, paying particular attention to the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, before moving on to discuss EU and 
international law. It is vital for business managers to have this comparative 
and international perspective since so many aerospace transactions involve 
multiple jurisdictions, with the United States and Europe remaining as 
important commercial hubs for the global space industry now valued at 
more than $300 billion.91
A.  Applicable U.S. Laws to Mitigate Trade Secrets Theft 
The problem presented by the theft of trade secrets has led some 
politicians and commentators to suggest that the United States needs a 
federal civil trade secret theft statute. As was mentioned in Part I, the 
current U.S. system utilizes only a federal criminal statute, the Economic 
Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996, and leaves civil actions to the states.92 In 
2012, as a response to growing concern over trade secrets theft, Congress 
enhanced the penalties for a violation of the EEA.93 Yet this response is 
89 See J. Nicholas Hoover, NSA Chief: China Behind RSA Attacks, INFO. WK. (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.informationweek.com/government/security/nsa-chief-china-behind-rsa-attacks/232700341.
90 See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, August Cole, & Yochi Dreazen, Computer Spies Breach Fighter-
Jet Project, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027491029837401.html;
William Jackson, RSA Confirms Its Tokens Used in Lockheed Hack, GCN (June 7, 2011), http://gcn.
com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx. This passage was first 
published in the Preface of SHACKELFORD, supra note 18. 
91 See Press Release, Space Foundation’s 2013 Report Reveals 6.7 Percent Growth in the Global 
Space Economy in 2012, SPACE FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.spacefoundation.org/media/press-
releases/space-foundations-2013-report-reveals-67-percent-growth-global-space-economy; ROBERT C.
HARDING, SPACE POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
ON THE FINAL FRONTIER 2 (2012). In 2006, the satellite telecommunications’ market alone exceeded 
$100 billion. See Keny Fuchter, China’s Military Space Strategy, RAF AIR POWER REV. 53, 62 (2009). 
92 See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
93 The Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, 18 U.S.C. § 
1832(a) (2013); The Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-269, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)-(b) (2013). 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 151 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 151 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
13 - SHACKELFORD_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16 2:21 PM
650 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:635 
seen by many to be inadequate and there is speculation that a federal civil 
cause of action is pending.94 The Obama Administration also conducted a 
further review of the existing legislation to determine if greater trade secret 
protections are warranted.95
Proposals for a federal civil cause of action have been a recurring 
theme in trade secret law for the past several decades.96 Such advocates 
typically argue that the current system of disparate state laws creates 
inefficiencies and burdens interstate actors.97 State courts also typically 
have less robust subpoena powers, weaker discovery, and more difficult 
jurisdictional hurdles to overcome. A federal cause of action would address 
these issues by establishing a uniform body of law and providing access to 
federal courts. Yet these arguments are not without their critics and the 
usefulness of a federal civil cause of action has been called into question.98
Despite these criticisms, several federal laws have recently been 
proposed to address the problem of trade secret theft. Take, for instance, the 
proposal by Representative Zoe Lofgren (D. California), who suggests that 
we should simply add a sentence to the EEA allowing any person injured by 
the theft of trade secrets to maintain a cause of action in federal court.99 Or, 
consider the Trade Secret Protection Act of 2014, proposed by 
Representative Holding (R. N. Carolina).100 This legislation is, as of this 
writing, before the House and Senate and provides a similar private cause of 
action for damages resulting from the misappropriation of trade secrets, as 
well as injunctive relief.101 In both cases, the bills provide broad protection 
against the misappropriation of trade secrets and include in the definition of 
misappropriation “espionage through electronic or other means.”102 This 
language appears to be specifically targeted at the problem of cyber 
espionage. However, the likelihood of either bill being passed in the current 
partisan environment remains in doubt (estimates from govtrack.us as of 
September 2014 are one percent for the first bill, H.R. 2466, and thirty-
94 See, e.g., Mark L. Krotoski, The Time Is Ripe for New Federal Civil Trade Secret Law, BNA 
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.bna.com/time-ripe-new-n17179917951/. 
95 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON 
MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 12 (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_ strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf.
96 See Krotoski, supra note 94. 
97 See, e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 427, 442 (1995). 
98 See Argento, supra note 47. 
99 PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2013, H.R. No. 113-
2466 (2013). 
100 TRADE SECRET PROTECTION ACT OF 2014, H.R. 114-5233 (2014). 
101 See, e.g., Will Congress Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act in 2015?, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 27, 
2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/will-congress-enact-federal-trade-secrets-act-2015.
102 TRADE SECRET PROTECTION ACT OF 2014, H.R. 114-5233, at 11 (2014). 
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seven percent for the second, H.R. 5233).103
The applicability of the legislation to the cybercrimes at issue does not 
seem to be in question, yet these proposed domestic legislative acts do not 
address the overarching challenges posed by cybercrime: the hurdles of 
jurisdiction, international extradition, attribution, and prosecution. The chief 
problem in the enforcement of trade secret theft is that the assailants are 
able to engage in their unlawful activity from safe havens: countries that are 
either unwilling or unable to police their networks. U.S. statutes by 
themselves do relatively little to improve the ability of the United States to 
extradite criminals from countries that actively support the use of electronic 
means to steal trade secrets (the applicable international law is discussed 
below). And improving the ability to litigate trade secret misappropriation 
does not address the problems of cyber vulnerability that facilitates the ease 
of these thefts. This is not to suggest that the proposed legislation would be 
without merit. The misappropriation of trade secrets by those within the 
jurisdictional bounds of the United States would arguably be simplified, 
including the possibility of victims being able to seek treble damages for 
when the misappropriation is willful.104 But these are only marginal 
benefits, and do not address the root concerns that generated the impetus for 
the legislation in the first place. 
An example of U.S. legislation that could be more on point is the 
Chinese Communist Economic Espionage Sanctions Act.105 This Act would 
go so far as to condemn the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese 
Communist Party outright for the theft of U.S. trade secrets, and impose 
sanctions on “Chinese state-owned enterprises . . . for benefitting from 
cyber and economic espionage against the United States.”106 These actions 
would involve the seizure of assets belonging to persons associated with 
Chinese state-owned enterprises that come within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States, the denial of visas to Chinese nationals having ties to 
those Chinese state-owned enterprises, and the freezing of their assets held 
by financial institutions based in the United States.107 However, while it 
may indeed be true that China is the main culprit targeting U.S. trade 
secrets and aerospace firms in particular, it is also a convenient scapegoat. 
Chinese networks are also vulnerable, by some estimates even more so than 
the United States,108 and it is a simple matter to spoof IP addresses to fool 
103 See GovTrack.us: Tracking the U.S Congress, https://www.govtrack.us/ (last visited Oct. 7, 
2014).
104 TRADE SECRET PROTECTION ACT OF 2014, supra note 100, at 9. 
105 Chinese Communist Economic Espionage Sanctions Act, H.R. 5103, 114th Cong. (2014). 
106 See id. at 1. 
107 See id. at 8–9. 
108 See China’s Infrastructure Vulnerable to Cyber Attack, FOXNEWS.COM (June 17, 2011), http:/
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investigators as to the true source of an attack, as the Boeing case study 
from Part I illustrated. Instead of targeting politically convenient culprits, it 
may be a better use of legislative bandwidth to build on the momentum 
begun with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework with expanded information 
sharing provisions and incentive programs for firms to employ best-in-class 
cybersecurity.
Although the prospect of comprehensive cybersecurity regulation is 
unlikely, the Obama Administration has utilized executive action to 
strengthen U.S. cybersecurity by partnering with industry through the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework process. In February 2014, NIST released its 
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, per 
Executive Order 13636.109 The Framework is comprised partly of private-
sector best practices that companies can adopt to better secure CI,110 and 
includes criterion by which to determine cyber-risk and protocols to assist 
in mitigating those risks. Although the Framework does not create any 
binding obligations for private sector actors and has no means of 
enforcement for those that choose to adopt it, its uptake may well be 
establishing a cybersecurity standard of care in the United States even 
without Congressional action.111 This holds the potential to spill over 
beyond traditional CI sectors to the private sector at large. 
The Framework’s basic structure divides cybersecurity into five broad 
“functions”: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.112 Each of these 
five functions is subdivided into categories, and each category contains 
subcategories paired with informative references.113 The Framework uses 
these functions to establish four implementation tiers, which identify 
incremental levels of preparation and response that serve as guidelines for 
businesses to model their own practices based on their perceived needs.114
Perhaps most importantly, the Framework provides a series of steps for 
/www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/06/17/chinas-infrastructure-vulnerable-to-cyber attack/. 
109 See WHITE HOUSE PRESS SEC’Y, EXECUTIVE ORDER ON IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/
02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-0. 
110 Mark Clayton, Why Obama’s Executive Order on Cybersecurity Doesn’t Satisfy Most 
Experts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/
0213/Why-Obama-s-executive-order-on-cybersecurity-doesn-t-satisfy-most-experts.
111 See, e.g., NIST’s Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework May Be Regarded as De Facto 
Mandatory, HOMELAND SEC. NEWS WIRE (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/
dr20140303-nist-s-voluntary-cybersecurity-framework-may-be-regarded-as-de-facto-mandatory (stating 
that experts have warned that many of the recommendations in the framework “may be used by courts, 
regulators, and even consumers to hold institutions accountable for failures that could have been 
prevented if the cybersecurity framework had been fully implemented by the respective institution”). 
112 NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 7, at 7. 
113 Id. at 1. 
114 Id.
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organizations to follow to utilize the Framework to assess and address their 
current cyber risk exposure. This equips companies with a clearly 
articulated process to follow to begin improving their cybersecurity, 
including the identification of gaps. Rather than imposing strict 
governmental regulations that may be overly burdensome or 
incomprehensibly vague, the Framework allows companies to incorporate 
cyber risk management in a manner that is consistent with their business 
goals and financial capabilities. By establishing clear guidelines for private-
sector actors, the NIST Framework promotes flexible cybersecurity 
standards and may well serve to facilitate the protection of trade secrets 
both in the United States and in other jurisdictions. 
B.  EU Cybersecurity Initiatives Related to Trade Secrets Theft 
The European Union’s approach to securing CI has been motivated by 
the March 2014 Madrid terrorist bombings.115 In the aftermath of the 
attacks, the EU Commission—the executive body of the European Union—
adopted suggestions for how to enhance “prevention, preparedness and 
response to terrorist attacks involving [CI].”116 CI in the European Union is 
defined broadly, referring to infrastructure that is “essential for the 
maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or 
social well-being, and the destruction or disruption of which would have a 
significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain 
those functions.”117 Examples include sectors similar to those often cited in 
the United States, such as “telecommunication and energy networks, 
financial services and transport systems, health services, and the provision 
of safe drinking water and food.”118 However, there is some question as to 
whether aerospace falls under this rubric. It is not singled out in applicable 
EU directives discussing critical infrastructure, though related areas are 
such as communications, government, and transport.119 Thus, it would be 
prudent for managers to treat aerospace as falling under these regulations, 
115 See Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New ‘Digital Divide’: Analyzing the 
Evolving Role of Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 119, 153 (2014) (opining that critical Infrastructure, as used in the EU context, demonstrates the 
extent to which securing infrastructure is a regional, and not solely national, issue. The term CI, though, 
suffers from many of the same ambiguities as CNI.) 
116 Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, at 2, COM (2006) 786 Final (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Communication Concerning 
EPCIP].
117 Proposal for a Council Decision on a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network 
(CIWIN), at 10, COM (2008) 676 Final (Oct. 27, 2008). 
118 Id. at 2. 
119 Critical Infrastructure Protection, EUROPA, (Aug. 17, 2010), http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33259_en.htm. 
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especially the more expansive set discussed next. 
Neither cyber offence nor cyber defense stops at national borders, 
especially in regions as economically integrated as Europe.120 As a result, in 
February 2013, the Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection committee introduced a proposed cybersecurity directive that 
dramatically changed the status quo of regulatory efforts and even went 
several steps further than the analogous U.S. efforts, such as the NIST 
Framework. In particular, if implemented, the EU policy would require 
firms to meet EU-developed standards, which could mean that these 
companies may “fundamentally have to change the way [their] business 
operates.”121 Among much else, this regime would require many firms with 
some nexus to the Internet to invest in new technologies, develop 
procedures to prove compliance to national and EU regulators, and 
undertake enhanced cyber risk mitigation measures to better manage 
attacks.122 Aerospace firms would likely be covered by these regulations 
and would then be faced with a choice of whether to develop a unique set of 
cybersecurity best practices to cover their European operations or simply 
adopt these standards in their global operations; thus, these aerospace firms 
would be assured of regulatory compliance but at increased cost. Firms in 
the U.S. context must often undertake a similar analysis when deciding 
whether to comply with oftentimes more stringent California regulatory 
requirements solely for that market or adopt them more broadly across their 
national operations making California laws at times de facto national 
regulations. It is also worth noting that EU regulators have reportedly had 
120 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning 
Measures to Ensure a High Common Level of Network and Information Security across the Union, at 3, 
COM (2013) 48 Final (Feb. 7, 2013). 
121 Warwick Ashford, How Will EU Cyber Security Directive Affect Business?, COMPUTER
WKL’Y (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240178256/How-will-EU-cyber 
security-directive-affect-business (citing Stewart Room, a partner at Field Fisher Waterhouse, who 
argues that this directive will mean that other firms beyond telecom companies will face regulatory 
burdens related to cybersecurity, including e-commerce platforms, internet payment gateways, social 
networks, search engines, cloud computing services, app stores). 
122 Id.; see also Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure 
Cyberspace, EUR. COMM’N, at 2–6 (Feb. 7, 2013) (Espousing an Internet freedom agenda that includes 
universal access, democratic and “efficient multi-stakeholder governance,” and a focus on attaining 
“cyber resilience.” To achieve this, the directive sets out a number of goals, including setting national-
level cybersecurity standards, creating national and regional CERTs, sharing private-sector best 
practices, and regularly assessing cyber risk—especially for firms operating critical infrastructure—so as 
to build a “cybersecurity culture.”). But see Stephen Gardner, Member States Reportedly Unconvinced 
on Need for EU Cybersecurity Directive, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 3, 2013), http://www.bna.com/
member-states-reportedly-n17179874317/ (reporting on questions from ministers arising from this 
mandate approach and noting that “other parts of the world, such as the USA, appear to opt for a more 
voluntary and flexible approach with regard to cybersecurity standards” such as the NIST framework 
and worrying about creating “inconsistencies for companies whose operations span several 
jurisdictions.”).
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regular contact with NIST officials over the extension of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework to Europe. Other nations, including Japan, India, 
and the Republic of Korea, have also been active in NIST-sponsored 
cybersecurity deliberations.123
C.  The Role of International Law 
No nation is an island in cyberspace, and as such, international law 
also has a vital role to play in enhancing cybersecurity and protecting trade 
secrets. Among the best-known and most important international treaties 
regulating cybersecurity is the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cybercrime, popularly known as the Budapest Convention.124 Myriad 
criminal offenses are defined under the Budapest Convention, including: 
illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, 
and misuse of devices.125 The Convention calls on signatories to adopt 
domestic laws to criminalize these offenses and to establish a regime to 
enhance international cooperation. As of October 2014, forty-three nations 
had ratified the accord.126 However, protections of trade secrets are not 
spelled out in the agreement, and enforcement mechanisms for 
noncompliance remain absent.127 Thus, while the Budapest Convention 
remains something of a gold standard for international collaboration to 
manage cyber attacks, its utility to the aerospace sector generally and the 
cause of trade secrets protections in particular is questionable. 
Aside from dedicated cybersecurity treaties, there is a range of 
applicable international law, both above and below the armed attack 
threshold, which defines when the law of war is activated.128 In the trade 
secrets context, though, among the most applicable laws are investment and 
123 Update on the Cybersecurity Framework, NIST 4 (July 31, 2014), http://nist.gov/
cyberframework/upload/NIST-Cybersecurity-Framework-update-073114.pdf (“NIST and other U.S. 
government officials have had discussions about the Framework with multiple foreign governments and 
regional representatives including organizations throughout the world, including—but not limited to—
the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, Korea, Estonia, Israel, Germany, and Australia.”). 
124 Convention on Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Nov. 23, 2001), http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm; see also MARCO GERCKE, UNDERSTANDING CYBERCRIME:
PHENOMENA, CHALLENGES AND LEGAL OPTIONS 127–28 (INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, 2012), available
at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/Cybercrime%20legislation%20EV6.pdf (listing 
other relevant model laws, including the Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer-
related Crime). 
125 Budapest Convention, arts. 2–6. 
126 See Convention on Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF EUR. TREATY OFF., http://www.conventions.coe.
int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=28/06/2013&CL=ENG (last updated Feb. 3, 
2014).
127 See id.
128 See generally Chapter 6 in SHACKELFORD, supra note 18. 
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trade treaties.129 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have long been an 
important component of international investment law.130 By 2013, there 
were nearly 3,000 BITs involving the vast majority of countries.131 These 
agreements cover a huge range of industry sectors and business activities 
and generally include a forum for resolving disputes in the form of investor-
state arbitration.132 At the July 2013 U.S.—China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue, the United States and China publicized plans to begin negotiating 
an expansive BIT that will reportedly include the difficult issue of 
enhancing bilateral cybersecurity.133 According to U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Jacob J. Lew, if successful, this would be “the first time China has agreed to 
negotiate a bilateral investment treaty, to include all sectors and stages of 
investment, with another country.”134 Although still mostly hypothetical,135
these agreements, including the proposed U.S.-China BIT, could pave the 
way for U.S. aerospace companies to file claims alleging trade secrets theft 
against foreign companies and perhaps even governments and have their 
case heard before a panel of neutral arbitrators.136 Although there would 
remain a question of whether a foreign sovereign would abide by a negative 
ruling, this state of affairs would likely be preferable to the current dearth of 
legal options for affected companies seeking to bring cases alleging trade 
secrets theft either in U.S. or foreign courts. 
Aside from BITs, cybersecurity is also becoming an important topic in 
regional and global trade negotiations. Ongoing U.S.–European Union trade 
talks have been shaped at least initially by concerns over NSA surveillance 
129 See Shackelford et al., supra note 57. 
130 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING xi (2007), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
iteiia20065_en.pdf.
131 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND 
TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT 101 (2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf. There 
were also another 339 trade agreements, bringing the total number of international investment 
agreements to 3,196. Id.; see also ICSID Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, https://icsid.
worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewBilateral&reqFrom=Mai
n (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). 
132 See Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 6 (2007). 
133 See Annie Lowrey, U.S. and China to Discuss Investment Treaty, but Cybersecurity Is a 
Concern, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2013, at A5. 
134 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
135 Cf. Leslie A. Pappas, Speed Up Bilateral Treaty Negotiations and Build Trust, China’s Xi 
Jinping Says, 31 INT’L TRADE REP. 1685 (2014) (noting pressure from China to hasten U.S.-China BIT 
negotiations).
136 See Xi Calls for More Strategic Trust Between China, U.S., XINHANET (Sept. 9, 2014), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/09/c_126968104.htm (“Xi also urged the two sides to speed 
up negotiations of a bilateral investment treaty, cement military-to-military ties, strengthen 
communication and coordination on climate change, fighting against terrorism, and regional and global 
flash points.”). 
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programs and intellectual property protections.137 The proposed Trans-
Pacific Partnership also has a cybersecurity component,138 and even the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) employs enforcement mechanisms that 
may be applicable to cyber attacks if national security concerns could be 
overcome.139 Together, these investment and trade regimes could provide a 
basis for fostering bilateral and regional collaboration to enhance global 
cybersecurity generally and better protect trade secrets in particular at a 
time of slow progress on domestic and multilateral progress toward 
cybersecurity policymaking.140 But they likely will not be enough absent the 
private sector taking proactive steps to improve cybersecurity from the 
ground up. 
III. NEED FOR PROACTIVE CYBERSECURITY
BEST PRACTICES IN THE AEROSPACE SECTOR
Imagine the feeling of excitement and opportunity that the Model T 
Ford represented to consumers in the early twentieth century. That 
newfound freedom came at a price, however, with early cars lacking safety 
features such as seatbelts, adjustable mirrors, and crumple zones to absorb 
impact, to say nothing of airbags. Despite the fact that many of these safety 
137 See, e.g., Doug Palmer, U.S., EU Launch Free Trade Talks Despite Spying Concerns, INS. J. 
(July 9, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2013/07/09/297817.htm. But see
James Fontanella-Khan, Brussels Opposes German Data Protection Push, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2013, at 
8 (“Brussels has ruled out a German push to include data protection rules in a proposed EU–U.S. free 
trade pact, arguing that it could derail the talks and ultimately weaken Europeans’ rights to privacy.”). 
138 See Kevin Collier, Sen. Ron Wyden on the Problems with the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
DAILY DOT (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/ron-wyden-trans-pacific-partnership/.
139 However, regarding the latter, while the WTO has been used as a forum to air broader 
concerns among the Member States, it has to date been a factor in the cybersecurity context because of 
provisions allowing nations to shirk their free trade commitments when they conflict with national 
security. See, e.g., ALLAN A. FRIEDMAN, BROOKINGS INST., CYBERSECURITY AND TRADE: NATIONAL
POLICIES, GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONSEQUENCES 10–11 (2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
~/media/research/files/papers/2013/09/
19%20cybersecurity%20and%20trade%20global%20local%20friedman/brookings cybersecuritynew.
pdf; Mark L. Movsesian, Essay, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2003) (describing the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and noting that trade 
disputes between nations “are to be resolved in adversarial proceedings before impartial panels of 
experts” under this system); James A. Lewis, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., Conflict and Negotiation 
in Cyberspace 49-51 (2013), available at https://csis.org/files/publication/130208_Lewis_
ConflictCyberspace_Web.pdf (discussing the applicability of the WTO dispute resolution processes to 
help manage cyber espionage). This limitation in the WTO composition underscores the need for a 
bilateral and regional approaches to enhancing cybersecurity. 
140 See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Essay, In Search of Cyber Peace: A Response to the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 106 (2012), available at http://www.
stanfordlawreview.org/online/cyber-peace; Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an “Information 
Weapon,” NPR (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701 
(discussing the fact that United Nations-sponsored cyber disarmament discussions have been ongoing 
since the late 1990s without much to show for it). 
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features seem intuitive in retrospect, it took some time to standardize them. 
Formal studies were needed to assess risk, and then stakeholders—
including companies, consumers, and governments – needed to perceive 
risks as important and devote resources to implementing fixes. One of the 
first popular reports pushing improving car safety was published by 
Popular Science in 1950, featuring the attention-grabbing title, “Making the 
Death Seat Safer,” and highlighting the potential of seatbelts and padded 
dashboards.141 However, it was not until 1958 that a Volvo engineer 
invented the three-point lap and shoulder seatbelt.142 It then took nearly two 
decades before the results of crash tests were published to inform 
consumers of cars’ variable safety performances.143 The first U.S. law 
mandating the use of seat belts was not passed until 1984.144
To continue this analogy we are now, unfortunately, in the 1960s with 
regards to cybersecurity. Regulations are present, but they have been slow 
to develop and do not reflect technological best practices. Nor is there 
widespread agreement on what the best ways are to mitigate cyber threats, 
or even on the scope of the problem; reaching consensus on what counts as 
an automobile accident is a far simpler proposition than defining a “cyber 
attack.”145 Still, some lessons may be gleaned from the morass of imperfect 
cyber attack data. Best practices are slowly arising, a process that may be 
hastened by the NIST Cybersecurity Framework process and the increasing 
attention being paid to cybersecurity by consumers and investors. 
Moreover, the importance of information sharing in the private sector and 
with policymakers is also now more widely accepted. We explore these 
developments next and conclude by couching them within a polycentric 
framework for promoting cyber peace. 
A.  Summary of Best Practices 
As seen in the NASA case study, perhaps the simplest yet most 
important element to any effective cybersecurity strategy is an 
organizational structure that empowers cybersecurity personnel. Too often 
we hear the story of a major corporation that suffers a massive data breach, 
only to have it revealed that they did not employ a CISO or similar 
executive. To take one recent example, “like Sony before it, Target did not 
141 See George H. Waltz, Jr., Making the Death Seat Safer, 157 POP. SCI. 82 (July 1950). 
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 This passage first appeared in Chapter 5 of SHACKELFORD, supra note 18.  Special thanks go 
to Amanda N. Craig for her help with this research. 
145 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TECH., POLICY, LAW, & ETHICS REGARDING U.
S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
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have a” CISO prior to its late 2013 data breach.146 Both firms do now.147
Although there are numerous names and positions that can adequately 
fill the role of a centralized cybersecurity officer, it is of upmost importance 
that cybersecurity be implemented within the C-suite structure. Security 
often represents a negative in the eyes of the corporate finances without 
clear positives given the lack of reliable data on cybersecurity cost-benefit 
analysis, and as such it is not always a popular topic to bring up. But by 
implementing cybersecurity within the C-suite, a firm can help assure itself 
that cybersecurity issues will be proactively considered prior to the 
occurrence of a breach, and that the company will have an accountable 
individual to turn to when vulnerability is exploited. 
Yet it is not enough to simply acknowledge that cybersecurity is an 
issue; organizations must take proactive steps to mitigate and deter cyber 
threats if they are to be adequately prepared for future cyber threats. The 
most effective corporate cybersecurity policies are those that attempt to 
preempt cyber attacks, hiring white hat hackers to conduct regular 
penetration testing, and utilizing employee awareness campaigns to ensure 
that the cybersecurity strategy is widely distributed and understood.148
Indeed, as the Boeing case study illustrated, firms must make education 
about cybersecurity issues a central part of the corporate learning process. 
Even the most advanced technical protections can often be undone if the 
employees of the company fail to utilize appropriate security measures. 
Simple lessons like not sharing or reusing passwords and identifying spam 
and phishing emails often have the most profound impact upon a 
company’s security.149 The good news is that more firms seem to be taking 
these lessons to heart. According to one 2010 survey, sixty-five percent of 
companies had “an overall information security strategy” in 2009, up from 
fifty-nine percent in 2008.150 Yet in 2012, according to a PwC survey, just 
forty-three percent of organizations with strategies called those strategies: 
1) “effective,” and 2) themselves “proactive” at implementing their plans,151
including the establishment of robust information sharing to protect against 
146 See Fred Donovan, Target Did Not Have CISO to Oversee Information Security Prior to 
Massive Breach, FIERCE SEC. (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.fierceitsecurity.com/story/target-did-not-
have-ciso-oversee-information-security-prior-massive-breach/2014-03-10.
147 See id.
148 See generally SHACKELFORD, supra note 18, at Chapter 5. 
149 See generally id. (providing a more comprehensive summary of corporate cybersecurity best 
practices in Chapter 5). 
150 Trial by Fire: What Global Executives Expect of Information Security, PWC 18–19 (Oct. 
2009), http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/information-security-survey/pdf/pwcsurvey2010_report.pdf.
151 Eye of the Storm: Key Findings from the 2012 Global State of Information Security Survey,
PwC 6 (2012), http://www.pwc.co.nz/global-state-of-information-survey.aspx.
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known cyber threats.152 We can do better. 
B.  The Case for an Aerospace Information Sharing Organization 
Information Sharing Analysis Centers (ISACs) were first established 
in 1998 as a response to Presidential Decision Directive 63, which called 
specifically for a public-private partnership to reduce vulnerability to cyber 
threats to CI.153 This was extended in 2003 under the Patriot Act, and has 
resulted in the creation of ISACs for numerous CI sectors.154 ISACs are 
private sector, non-profit organizations that serve as centralized hubs for the 
sharing of information related to cybersecurity threats.155 Through ISACs, 
companies with similar cyber-risk exposure can anonymously communicate 
cyber attacks perpetrated against them, allowing for rapid analysis, 
response, and vulnerability sharing to other members of the group.156 ISACs 
essentially serve as a repository for vulnerability information, which is 
useful in compiling the risks, providing advice in real time, and 
communicating information to other ISAC members.157 Through 
information sharing, organizations can help immunize themselves from the 
threats encountered by others, including, we argue, aerospace organizations. 
Perhaps the most fundamental attribute of successful ISACs is 
anonymization. ISACs often (and indeed should) include government 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies within their ranks, both as 
repositories of threat information and as analytical powerhouses to pursue 
perpetrators.158 But the inclusion of government agencies in data sharing 
arrangements would necessarily arouse the fear and suspicion of private-
sector actors, especially in the post-Snowden world where the specter of 
government regulation or enforcement may overshadow their interest in 
proactive threat resolution, and especially among tech firms. Furthermore, 
attribution, even among private-sector members, may influence business 
dealings as a company that is repeatedly subjected to cyber attacks may be 
deemed to be a less desirable business partner. By ensuring that the data 
submitted to an ISAC is anonymized prior to sharing, private actors are 
enticed to share information without fear of public or private repercussions 
152 Id.
153 Presidential Decision Directive 63 (May 22, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm.
154 Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center, ES-ISAC, http://www.esisac.
com/SitePages/Home.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
155 Id.
156 NAT’L COUNCIL OF ISACS, http://www.natlisacs.org (last visited October 1, 2014). 
157 See id.
158 See Cybersecurity Results, DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-results (last visited Oct. 
17, 2014). 
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(that is, unless of course the repository itself is breached). 
The use of anonymization, however, should not be interpreted as a 
strict requirement for all ISAC submissions. Rather, successful ISACs 
utilize a tiered information sharing system, where data sharing may be 
restricted or conditioned based upon the nature of the information at issue. 
An example system is the “traffic light protocol” (TLP) utilized by the 
Financial Sector ISAC (FS-ISAC).159 This allows companies that submit 
data to the FS-ISAC to designate the degree of information sharing with a 
color: red for strict, or named party only, distribution; amber for limited 
distribution within their own organization; green for full distribution within 
the ISAC community, and white for full public distribution.160 Therefore, 
companies can choose to make submissions that are either anonymous or 
attributed and can exercise greater control over who will learn of their 
connection to the submission. Through the use of tiered systems for 
information sharing, companies are given greater control over the extent 
that their data is attributable to them, while still facilitating the maximum 
agreeable data distribution. 
Furthermore, as alluded to previously, the inclusion of government 
agencies is essential to optimal functioning in response to cyber threats. 
Government agencies like the NSA, FBI, and DHS all bring vast 
technological prowess, experience in cyber response processes, and data 
regarding vulnerabilities and best practices.161 Indeed, the initial PDD that 
led to the establishment of ISACs called for such “public-private 
partnership to reduce vulnerability.”162 From the outset, ISACs have been 
designed with the intention of allowing greater information sharing between 
public and private actors, and ISACs must utilize the resources offered by 
these government agencies if they are to most effectively minimize 
vulnerabilities in their sector. However, this information sharing should be 
a two-way street with the public sector similarly learning from business, 
along with businesses, including aerospace firms, learning from one 
another.
ISACs should also consider other ISACs as resources when analyzing 
and responding to cyber threats. Although each industry sector faces unique 
challenges, many of the concerns overlap sectors, and utilizing the expertise 
159 See FINANCIAL SERVICES INFORMATION SHARING & ANALYSIS CENTER OPERATING RULES
18 (FS-ISAC), http://www.fsisac.com/sites/default/files/FS-ISAC_OperatingRules_2012.pdf.
160 Traffic Light Protocol Matrix and Frequently Asked Questions, US-CERT, https://www.us-
cert.gov/tlp (last visited Oct. 8, 2014); see also Denise Anderson, The Role of the ISACs in Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience, RSA CONF., http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_
upload/cle-t10-the-role-of-the-isacs-in-critical-infrastructure-resilience.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
161 See Cybersecurity Results, supra note 158. 
162 Presidential Decision Directive, supra note 153. 
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and experience of other ISACs prevents any one industry from being 
secluded from developments in cybersecurity best practices. As other 
repositories of information sharing with similar priorities and operating 
structures, ISACs must learn from one another to optimize cyber threat 
response, especially for organizations that straddle critical infrastructure 
designations like aerospace. 
Focusing on the aerospace context, lessons may be taken from the 
Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC) and National Health ISAC (NH-ISAC) 
among others in crafting an aerospace information-sharing organization, 
which would represent an expansion of the aviation ISAC currently in 
development of which Boeing is a founding member.163 FS-ISAC provides 
useful experience as both a high-volume target of cyber attackers, as well as 
an industry with significant government oversight. Like aerospace and the 
FAA, the financial services sector has learned how to incorporate SEC, 
DHS, CDC, and other governmental oversight into its information sharing 
structure.164 Similarly, NH-ISAC would provide useful experience as a 
sector that is increasingly focused on the protection of trade secrets against 
theft and misappropriation. Like aerospace, many elements of the health 
sector rely on trade secrets for the protection of intellectual property 
rights,165 and this focus on trade secrets has led to the crafting of 
information sharing practices that attempt to prevent the over-disclosure of 
this confidential information.166
Yet other criteria are also vital indices of a successful ISAC. Tools like 
tiered memberships, open source databases, cyber threat drills and National 
Level Exercises, as well as other cybersecurity trends should be considered 
to optimize information sharing and ensure preparedness for cyber threats in 
the aerospace context. Additionally, improving the means of information 
sharing is also increasingly important, as the sheer volume of information 
shared may be overwhelming and thus unhelpful. Tools such as wikis, web 
portals, and digests may be preferable to the traditional listserv, as these 
allow for better organization of the flow of data.167 These platforms 
163 See Securing Airline Information on the Ground and in the Air, BOEING, http://www.boeing.
com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2012_q3/5/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
164 See Cybersecurity: Hearing Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 113th 
Cong. 4-6 (2013) (testimony of Charles Blauner, on behalf of the American Bankers Association), 
available at http://www.fsscc.org/fsscc/legislative/2013/Cybersecurity-May21-Final.pdf. 
165 Gibbons et al., The Increasing Importance of Trade Secret Protection in the Biotechnology, 
Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Fields, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 261, 262-264 (2007). 
166 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Nat’l Health Info. Sharing & Analysis Ctr., Inc. 
and the U.S. Food and Drug Admin. Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health (Aug. 26, 2014), 
available at
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstandingMOUs/Other 
MOUs/ucm412565.htm.
167 Tay Pei Lyn Grace, Wikis as a Knowledge Management Tool, J. KNOWL. MGMT., Oct. 2009, 
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emphasize searching, tagging, and categorizing threats, ensuring that users 
can query based on meaningful metrics.168 But as technologies improve and 
cybersecurity norms evolve, so too must ISACs update their practices to 
reflect this changing world. 
Critical infrastructure is not the only context in which cyber threat 
information sharing is taking off; indeed, it is becoming commonplace in 
retail and other commercial sectors. Recently, the Retail Industry Leaders 
Association (RILA) launched the Research Cyber Intelligence Sharing 
Center (R-CISC), which has at its center a Retail ISAC.169 The retail sector 
has been increasingly under fire during the past several years for its 
repeated security breaches resulting in the theft of customer data.170
Incidents like the Target breach of 2013171 and the Home Depot breach 
from 2014172 received major public scrutiny and prompted systemic 
changes, both in the structure of the companies targeted173 and in the retail 
sector generally. The R-CISC is part of an industry wide response that 
acknowledges the growing problem of cyber attacks and attempts to 
improve cybersecurity through information sharing and public/private 
partnerships.174 This development helps to demonstrate the increasing 
perceived importance of expanding information sharing networks across an 
array of industries and sectors. 
For the aerospace sector in particular, information sharing would serve 
as a powerful resource in the management of cyber threats. Information 
sharing is already becoming a mainstay in the commercial aviation sector. 
In 2006, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
16, established a National Strategy for Aviation Security, and led to the 
creation of the Air Domain Intelligence Integration Center (ADIIC), which 
is a centralized hub for government information on aviation security 
information.175 This was furthered in 2014 with the announcement of an 
Aviation ISAC (Aero-ISAC) that would coordinate with the ADIIC to 
at 64. 
168 Id.
169 R-CISC: Retail Cyber Intelligence Sharing Center, RILA, available at http://www.rila.org/
rcisc/Home/Pages/default.aspx
170 See, e.g., Data Breach FAQs, TARGET, available at https://corporate.target.com/about/
shopping-experience/payment-card-issue-FAQ (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
171 See id.
172 Maggie McGrath, Home Depot Confirms Data Breach, Investigating Transactions from April 
Onward, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/09/08/home-depot-
confirms-data-breach-investigating-transactions-from-april-onward/.
173 Anna Prior, Target Hires Tech-Security Chief from GM, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2014), http://
online.wsj.com/articles/target-hires-information-security-chief-1402422451.
174 See R-CISC, supra note 169. 
175 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16 (June 22, 2006), available at http://fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nspd/nspd-47.pdf.
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facilitate public/private information sharing.176 Yet this endeavor has 
unnecessarily limited its own scope, and the information sharing would 
benefit from broadening to include aerospace within its ambit. 
The inclusion of aerospace writ large in the proposed Aero-ISAC is a 
natural extension of this industry to cover related threats, especially to 
valuable trade secrets. Aerospace and aviation naturally have a great deal of 
overlap, which suggests that aerospace would be functionally included to 
some degree even if not designed as such. The inclusion of aerospace would 
also broaden the scope of the organization, bringing in major actors like 
NASA and SpaceX, whose experiences might otherwise be isolated. 
Furthermore, the attackers that are interested in aviation technologies are 
likely just as interested in aerospace technologies, and this overlap of 
attackers would suggest that the data from individual attacks is relevant 
across both sectors. Given the overlap in technical problems, member firms, 
and cyber threats, expansion of the Aero-ISAC to an aerospace ISAC is a 
logical and beneficial step. 
The Aero-ISAC should be implemented to incorporate those elements 
that have best served other sector ISACs. This would include anonymized 
reports, tiered information sharing, and partnerships with other ISACs and 
information sharing agencies such as ADIIC. A successful Aero-ISAC 
would also likely include a tiered governance structure in which larger 
corporations would purchase premium memberships that ensure high-level, 
decision-making authority, recognizing both their influence in field and the 
scope of their resources. This means that the Aero-ISAC would be a 
partnership of a large number of aerospace firms, but that the central 
governing body would be composed of major market actors, with the daily 
operations being independently controlled. However, in this structure, 
minority representation for smaller aerospace firms would also be vital 
since they are perhaps even more concerned with safeguarding trade 
secrets, the lifeblood of many startups. And finally, the Aero-ISAC would 
reach out to governmental agencies like the DHS and FAA, as well as to 
international cyber threat repositories such as the International Multilateral 
Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT)177 to ensure the maximum of 
information sharing and analytics. By increasing the interconnectivity 
throughout the sector, the Aero-ISAC can maintain private-sector 
176 Rachel King, Aviation Industry and Government to Share Cyber Threats in New Intelligence 
Center, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/04/15/aviation-industry-and-
government-to-share-cyberthreats-in-new-intelligence-center.
177 About Us, IMPACT, http://www.impact-alliance.org/aboutus/ITU-IMPACT.html (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2014); see Strategy, ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/Strategy.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2014); IMPACT, http://www.impact-alliance.org/aboutus/mission-&-vision.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
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independence while facilitating cybersecurity. The Obama Administration’s 
cybersecurity information sharing proposals could help in this regard to 
break down the siloed approach to managing the cyber threat and allowing 
best practices to diffuse more readily between critical infrastructure sectors 
and with the broader economy.178
In many respects the biggest hurdle in cybersecurity is keeping pace 
with the rapidly evolving nature of the threat. This observation applies 
doubly for the aerospace sector; the shear scope of data that must be 
protected means that it is subject to novel attacks frequently, while the 
subject matter’s demand makes it a prime target for both international 
criminal groups and governments alike. The large footprint of defense 
contractors like Boeing and Lockheed Martin means that they each possess 
huge repositories of data on cyber threats, and a purely isolationist view to 
security weakens both themselves and the industry as a whole, thus 
illustrating the need for a polycentric approach to enhancing aerospace 
cybersecurity.
C.  Necessity for a Polycentric Approach 
Professor Elinor Ostrom and her collaborates deserve credit for 
developing the field of polycentric governance as part of her work on 
collective action problems.179 The basic notion of polycentric governance, 
as applied to global collective action problems such as cyber attacks, is the 
argument that “a single governmental unit” may be incapable of fostering 
cyber peace in part because free riders discourage “trust and reciprocity” 
between stakeholders.180 Some stakeholders enjoy the benefits of others’ 
sacrifices without realizing the costs; solutions “negotiated at the global 
level, if not backed by a variety of efforts at national, regional, and local 
levels, are not guaranteed to work well.”181 Professor Ostrom thus 
178 See White House Press Release, SECURING CYBERSPACE—President Obama Announces 
New Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal and Other Cybersecurity Efforts (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/13/securing-cyberspace-president-obama-announces-new-
cybersecurity-legislat.
179 See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 10 (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/
pe/2009/04268.pdf.;
179 Id. at 35; see Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate 
Change at 9 (Harv. Proj. on Int’l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper No. 33, 2010) (published as 9 
PERSP. ON POL. 7 (2011)) (discussing the feasibility of managing diverse problems within the climate 
change context with diverse institutions). 
180 Id. at 35; see Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate 
Change at 9 (Harv. Proj. on Int’l Climate Agreements Discussion Paper No. 33, 2010) (published as 9 
PERSP. ON POL. 7 (2011)) (discussing the feasibility of managing diverse problems within the climate 
change context with diverse institutions). 
181 Ostrom, supra note 179, at 4. 
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challenged the theory of collective action,182 arguing that instead of top-
down, state-imposed regulations, researchers found that small groups across 
an array of contexts do in fact cooperate and can create the proper 
incentives and conditions for optimal collective action.183 The polycentric 
regimes were more flexible and benefited from local knowledge, unlike top-
down regulatory schemes.184 These observations corroborated experiments 
finding that externally imposed regulations can in fact crowd out 
individuals’ voluntary cooperative behavior.185 An inflexible, 
comprehensive regime then could actually stifle innovation by crowding out 
smaller-scale efforts might be more effective at promoting, for example, 
cyber peace.186 That is in part why Professor Ostrom has argued that 
polycentric regulation is “the best way to address transboundary 
problems . . . since the complexity of these problems lends itself well to 
many small, issue-specific units working autonomously as part of a network 
that is addressing collective action problems. It is an application of the 
maxim, ‘think globally, but act locally.’”187 Bottom-up information sharing 
efforts such as those described above in the aviation and retail sectors, 
along with collaborative policymaking efforts such as the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework that helps to identify and instill best practices, 
are examples of such a polycentric undertaking to promote cybersecurity. 
Similar private-sector led endeavors such as private-sector certification 
schemes identifying aerospace companies with the most secure supply 
chains should receive continuing encouragement to refine cybersecurity 
best practices most applicable to the aerospace sector as part of an ongoing 
182 The traditional theory of the collective action problem was first articulated in the 1960s 
Mancur Olsen, an economist and social scientist from the University of Maryland. See generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965) (providing the first comprehensive explication of the collective action problem). 
183 See Ostrom, supra note 179, at 8-10 (discussing he shortcomings of the conventional theory 
of collective action); Elinor Ostrom, Public Entrepreneurship: A Case Study in Ground Water Basin 
Management (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Calif.); IMPROVING IRRIGATION
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN NEPAL (Ganesh Shivakoti & Elinor Ostrom, eds., 2002); Elinor 
Ostrom & Harini Nagendra, Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People from the Air, on the Ground, 
and in the Laboratory, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 19224, 19224-25 (2006).
184 See id.
185 See Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical 
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (1999); Ostrom, infra note 186, at 656 
(citing Andrew F. Reeson & John G. Tisdell, Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: An 
Experimental Test of Motivational Crowding, 68 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 273 (2008) (finding 
“externally imposed regulation that would theoretically lead to higher joint returns ‘crowded out’ 
voluntary behavior to cooperate.”). 
186 See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex 
Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 656 (2010). 
187 Interview with Elinor Ostrom, Distinguished Professor, Indiana University-Bloomington, in 
Bloomington, Ind. (Oct. 13, 2010). This research builds from Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort, & 
Jamie D. Prenkert, How Businesses Can Promote Cyber Peace, 36 UNIV. PENN. J. INT’L L. 353 (2015). 
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polycentric effort at safeguarding trade secrets and promoting cyber peace. 
CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed the multifaceted cyber threat facing the 
private sector and has argued for the necessity of a polycentric response 
recognizing in particular the vital role of information sharing and 
implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to help stem the 
theft of valuable trade secrets. The aerospace sector is in some ways unique 
in that it is dominated by relatively few actors, which in some ways makes 
the task of information sharing easier if economic, political, and security 
concerns may be overcome. The fact that this process has begun with the 
proposed Aviation ISAC is encouraging, but these efforts should be 
expanded to the aerospace sector writ large and infused with best practices 
gleaned from other successful ISACs discussed in Part III. As firms of all 
sizes and across myriad sectors work to better manage cyber attacks, 
aerospace has the opportunity to become a norm entrepreneur leading the 
way both above and beneath the clouds to a new frontier complete with 
some measure of cyber peace. It is an ambitious mission that, perhaps, these 
organizations are in some ways well situated to undertake if information-
sharing barriers may be overcome and proactive cybersecurity measures 
encouraged.
